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Abstract 
Leon Festinger’s account of cognitive dissonance, published in 1957, has become one of the 
most successful theories in the history of social psychology. I argue that Festinger’s frame-
work—and the research it generated over the last sixty years—can shed light on key aspects of 
readers’ engagement with literary characters. Literature can invite the audience to vicariously ex-
perience characters’ dissonance through an empathetic mechanism, but it can also induce disso-
nant states in readers by encouraging them to take on attitudes and beliefs that are significantly 
different from their own. I suggest that there are two strategies—or patterns of reader-
response—through which the audience can cope with the dissonance between their own 
worldview and the characters’: attitude change and imaginative resistance. In the first, readers 
adjust their own beliefs and values according to what they have experienced and learned in 
adopting characters’ perspectives. By contrast, in imaginative resistance readers’ worldview pre-
vents them from establishing an empathetic bond with characters. I integrate these hypotheses 
into a model that builds on theoretical as well as empirical insights into reader-response. 
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1. Introduction 
Just before throwing himself from the window of his London apartment, Septimus War-
ren Smith—the shell-shocked co-protagonist of Virginia Woolf’s Mrs. Dalloway—has a 
moment of lucidity. His hallucinations and paranoid ramblings give way to an apparently 
sober, self-possessed state: 
 
There remained only the window, the large Bloomsbury lodging-house window; the tire-
some, the troublesome, and rather melodramatic business of opening the window and 
throwing himself out. . . . He did not want to die. Life was good. The sun hot. Only hu-
man beings? Coming down the staircase opposite an old man stopped and stared at him. 
[Doctor] Holmes was at the door. “I’ll give it you!” he cried, and flung himself vigorously, 
violently down on to Mrs. Filmer’s area railings. (164) 
 
Septimus does not want to die, and yet he performs an action whose inevitable—and 
foreseeable—consequence is death. He does so while his imaginary arch-enemy, Doctor 
Holmes, is about to break into his apartment, serving as a living reminder of what 
Septimus calls “human nature”: the repressive power of human institutions, but also the 
destiny of trauma and mental illness to which he has been condemned by fighting in the 
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First World War.1 Yet Septimus’s flight from the window is more than a flight from his 
existential condition, from “human nature” in its most brutal aspect, as symbolized by 
Holmes. Septimus’s gesture is also the demonstration of a clash between the course of 
action he takes (“throwing himself out”) and the mixture of beliefs and attitudes that 
would seem to disqualify such action (“He did not want to die. Life was good. The sun 
hot”). As narratologists have long argued, narrative thrives on conflict. David Herman 
lists conflict among his basic elements of narrative, labeling it world disruption: it consists 
in one or more “events introducing disequilibrium or noncanonical situations into [the 
storyworld]” (133). Conflict is one of the thematic elements that makes a story “tellable” 
or worth telling (see Baroni). At the same time, narrative requires the beliefs, desires, in-
tentions of an anthropomorphic subject—a character.2 When those two ingredients of 
narrativity are combined, when the conflict dwells in the subject, and specifically in the 
gap between acting and reflecting, wanting and not wanting, seeing and imagining, we 
have extremely fertile ground for storytelling. Some of the most famous scenes of world 
literature—from Don Quixote’s mistaking windmills for giants to Hamlet’s “To be or 
not to be” monologue—involve a clash between seemingly incompatible mental states. 
What is perhaps less known is that such clash has a name in social psychology, and 
that it has been the object of one of the most successful theories in the history of this 
field: the theory—first advanced by Leon Festinger in 1957—of “cognitive dissonance.” 
According to Festinger, cognitive dissonance refers to the psychological disequilibri-
um—with its attendant experience of discomfort—that derives from holding two mental 
states, one of which seems to be inconsistent with the other. Not wanting to die and 
wanting to throw oneself from a window are inconsistent drives. But the inconsistency 
can be considerably less dramatic, and still give rise to cognitive dissonance. In 
Festinger’s own example: “If a person were standing in the rain and yet could see no evi-
dence that he was getting wet, these two cognitions would be dissonant with one another 
because he knows from experience that getting wet follows from being out in the rain” 
(14).  
Published in 1957, Festinger’s book pre-dates many of the key texts of the so-called 
“cognitive revolution” (see Miller), and appears to be firmly grounded in the social-
psychological research that was dominant in the 1950s. Yet Festinger’s use of the adjec-
tive “cognitive” and of the term “cognitions,” as in the passage just quoted, is suggestive. 
Even more strikingly, Festinger refers repeatedly to ‘invisible’ psychological states such 
as beliefs, desires, and dispositions, thus overthrowing the behaviorist bias towards ob-
servable behavior and anticipating the rise of cognitive psychology (with its critique of 
behaviorism). What Festinger does not share, of course, is the computational vocabulary 
and AI-inspired models that characterize mainstream cognitivism. His emphasis is not 
on mental processes per se but on “social behavior as the responses of a thinking organ-
ism continually acting to bring order into his world” (American Psychological Associa-
tion 784), in the words of the “Distinguished Scientific Contribution” award presented 
to Festinger in 1959. In this sense, Festinger’s theory of cognitive dissonance and its in-
 
1 See the following passages in Woolf’s novel: “So there was no excuse; nothing was whatever the 
matter [with Septimus], except the sin for which human nature had condemned him to death; that he 
did not feel” (99). “Human nature, in short, was on him—the repulsive brute, with the blood-red nos-
trils. Holmes was on him” (101). 
2 Such representation of an anthropomorphic subject would correspond to Herman’s (137–153) “what 
it’s like” element of narrative, or to Monika Fludernik’s “experientiality” (cf. Fludernik 30). 
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tellectual history can help us interrogate the meaning that the adjective “cognitive” has in 
phrases such as “cognitive literary studies” or “cognitive approaches to the humanities.” 
To what extent does this label imply a commitment to the cognitivist paradigm, perhaps 
in its more recent, neurocognitive version? Or could it be taken in the looser sense in 
which Festinger used the term in his influential study of cognitive dissonance? 
Whatever the answer to these key questions, Festinger’s theory and the experimental 
research that it generated have considerable potential for theorizing narrative, and read-
ers’ engagement with literary narrative in particular. In this article I seek to develop this 
potential by exploring readers’ strategies for dealing with cognitive dissonance in their 
relations to literary characters. Within the current landscape of cognitive approaches to 
narrative and literature, my account falls into what I have called the “processual” camp 
(Bernini and Caracciolo 16–19): the study, either speculative or empirical, of the psycho-
logical processes through which readers respond to literary narratives. Such “cognitive 
reception theory” (see Eder) is, in my view, the most promising avenue of inquiry for 
cognitive approaches to literature, as it involves a two-way dialogue with the cognitive 
sciences rather than the unidirectional importation of concepts and models from the sci-
ences to the humanities.3 But a two-way dialogue also means that hypotheses and specu-
lations on reader-response have to be “accountable” in the eyes of psychologists: hence, 
the need for a closer integration between literary research and experimental methods, 
following in the footsteps of empirical literary scholars such as Bortolussi and Dixon, 
Miall, and Hakemulder. Although the present article is not based on an original empirical 
study, it is at least consistent with experimental research both on cognitive dissonance in 
real-world settings and on readers’ engagement with characters. The indirect empiricism 
that I practice here is a first step in the direction of a more empirically oriented reception 
theory, which deals with flesh-and-blood audiences rather than with ghostly “implied” 
and “model” readers.4 Specifically, as the title of this article suggests, I am interested in 
patterns of reader-response, that is in the temporal and cognitive dynamics through which 
recipients of narrative deal with (and attempt to reduce) the dissonance that can be gen-
erated by their encounters with fictional characters. 
I will be concerned with a set of questions that have attracted increasing attention in 
recent years—within literary studies (Keen), but also within psychological approaches to 
fiction (Hakemulder; Oatley 155–175)—because of their broad societal implications: 
how does reading literary texts, and particularly empathizing with characters, change 
readers’ socio-cultural beliefs and values? Can reading literature encourage prosocial (i.e., 
altruistic) behavior? Extensive research is needed before we can answer such questions 
satisfactorily. In the context of this article, I will limit myself to drawing attention to the 
complexity of these issues—the large number of factors involved and the non-linearity 
of the interaction between storyworlds and readers’ experiential background.5 Between 
the two reader-response patterns that I label “attitude change” and “imaginative re-
sistance” there is a vast grey area where dissonance is experienced vicariously, on behalf 
 
3 The call for such two-way dialogue is a recurring motif in cognitive approaches to literature and nar-
rative: see, e.g., Herman (Story Logic 299) and Sternberg (352). 
4 Needless to say, these labels come from Iser’s and Eco’s classical reader-response theories. 
5 In past work (Caracciolo, “Notes”) I introduced the term “experiential background” to refer to the 
sum of an individual’s past experiences, beliefs, and values that guide his or her interaction with reali-
ty. This term is interchangeable with phenomenological concepts such as “worldview” and “life 
world” (see Husserl; Schütz). 
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of the characters rather than in a first-person way: literary texts and fictional characters 
seem to enter readers’ life worlds without producing any measurable change in readers’ 
self-concept or beliefs.  
Most of our transactions with fictional characters seem to occur in this no man’s land. 
But this does not prove that such transactions are worthless, of course. It only indicates 
the need for more sophisticated tools to probe readers’ engagement with storyworlds—
tools that place a premium on reflection and dialogue as means of negotiating the read-
ing experience. As Keen puts it, “readers themselves, especially those who discuss books 
and bring others into conversation about the implications of fiction, possess the power 
[of changing people’s attitudes and behavior] that they so often attribute to novels” 
(167). It is not so much the reading of literary narrative in itself, but the activity of re-
flecting on and debating its significance that can leave a mark on readers’ worldview. In-
terpretation thus becomes a third strategy for taming the dissonance that (as we’ll see in 
the next section) may be produced in readers’ interactions with literature. To put this 
point otherwise, the divide—and, potentially, the dissonance—between readers’ real 
world and storyworlds can be reduced via literary interpretation and other practices of 
literary meaning-making (see Caracciolo, “Narrative, Meaning, Interpretation”). Even 
though this article focuses on character-oriented responses, attitude change and imagina-
tive resistance, my own close readings of Woolf’s Mrs. Dalloway and Martin Amis’s Time’s 
Arrow—the two case studies of the next sections—will demonstrate the relevance and 
inescapability of interpretation as a way of articulating the relevance of literature.6 
 
 
2. Focus on cognitive dissonance 
The thrust of Festinger’s theory of cognitive dissonance is that human beings continu-
ously strive towards the reduction of dissonance: whenever possible, they attempt to re-
duce the inconsistencies—local and global—that tend to arise while coping with the nat-
ural and (especially) socio-cultural world. In this sense, dissonance may be taken as an 
aspect of the fundamental “difference” that cognitive semiotician Barend van Heusden 
sees as the driving force behind specifically human forms of semiotic and cultural cogni-
tion: “[the] awareness of absence, or difference (in relation to the acquired patterns of behav-
ior) . . . seems to be basic to human cognition: what we recognize is not, is never identical 
with the patterns used to recognize. We do not live in, and reality does not coincide with, 
our representations. Humans not only recognize and act according to a more or less sta-
ble patterns but they can also not recognize a pattern” (614–615). Recognizing the incon-
sistency of one’s thought processes in the experience of dissonance is a reflective ap-
praisal of that background of difference accompanying our engagement with the world. 
To go one step further, it may be speculated that art is one of the strategies that enable 
us to “tame”—i.e., reduce—the dissonance that is at the core of the human condition.7 
By representing dissonance, as Woolf does by narrating the predicament of Septimus 
Warren Smith, a fictional character, humans distance themselves from and assert their 
control over the dissonance that permeates their daily lives. We can therefore consider 
 
6 See Jackson on the problematic status of literary interpretation in cognitive literary studies. 
7 Cf. again van Heusden, who draws a connection between meta-cognition (reflecting on one’s cogni-
tive faculties and skills) and art: as a “very basic form of dealing with difference [meta-cognition] lies 
at the basis of a number of cultural domains. The arts, religion, and philosophy are important forms 
of meta-cognition in modern and in contemporary culture” (621). 
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artistic practices, including narrative art, as controlled experiments in the creation and 
taming of dissonance. In the context of this article I will expand on this idea by propos-
ing a few hypotheses on how dissonance is created—and tamed—by readers in their re-
sponses to literary characters. First of all, however, it is useful to look at how dissonance 
research evolved in the sixty years since the publication of Festinger’s original study. Joel 
Cooper’s 2007 book provides a helpful guide through this maze of mostly experimental 
research. 
The major innovation in dissonance theory is that dissonance is no longer defined in 
terms of inconsistency between mental states. Cooper writes: “Inconsistency is still an 
important concept but more as a heuristic than as an accurate representation of the cog-
nitions that arouse dissonance” (80). According to the model proposed by Cooper and 
Fazio in 1984, what defines dissonance is an evaluation of the aversive—that is, nega-
tive—consequences of an action that one is, nevertheless, choosing to carry out (see 
Cooper and Fazio). Septimus’s suicide is a textbook example of this kind of evaluation. 
The upshot of this redefinition is that dissonance is firmly anchored to the realm of ac-
tion and behavior: an “internal” conflict between two incompatible attitudes does not by 
itself create dissonance, but only the “acting out” of those attitudes in the public, 
intersubjective world. While this move makes cognitive dissonance theory more testa-
ble—and more consistent with experimental results—it also restricts the scope of the 
concept, so that Festinger’s account may still seem more productive for our purposes. 
Other developments in dissonance research seem to lend themselves much better to 
theorizing dissonance in art and narrative. One of these developments is what Cooper 
calls “the emergence of the self in dissonance theory” (90). Starting with Elliot Ar-
onson’s work in the 1960s (see Aronson), a number of studies have shown that the self-
concept (i.e., people’s model and perception of themselves) plays a key role both in trig-
gering cognitive dissonance and in suggesting strategies for coping with it. As Cooper 
puts it, “the self is a potential standard of judgment that we use to assess whether a be-
havioral consequence is aversive or not” (115). We will see in the next section that what 
psychologists call the “self-concept” is deeply implicated in people’s responses to literary 
characters. 
Another topic that has emerged in recent dissonance research is that of vicarious dis-
sonance. To quote again Cooper: “Imagine . . . if dissonance also occurred when other 
people made choices or when others acted in a way that brought about an aversive event. 
If this happened, it would multiply the occasions in which we experienced, and needed 
to reduce, dissonance. Current research tells us that it does happen, at least under certain 
conditions” (117). Conceivably, vicarious dissonance could form the basis for readers’ 
feeling dissonance in response to literary characters, such as Septimus, who are going 
through a dissonant experience—in this case, the most dissonant experience of all, since 
Septimus’s dilemma involves choosing between life and death.  
There is one phrase in the Woolf passage quoted above that seems to hint at this pos-
sibility of sharing dissonance with others. It is the question “Only human beings?”—a 
scrap of the character’s consciousness whose brevity and elusiveness attracts the reader’s 
attention, as if it concealed an important clue. What can Septimus mean? Is he asking 
whether there might be something—another life, a chance for transcendence—beyond 
the self-destructive act that he is about to perform? Or is it rather a cry of desperation, 
an expression of the inexorable finitude of the human condition? There is no clear-cut 
answer to these questions, no solid ground for interpreting Septimus’s phrase; yet its 
very openness seems to involve the reader in the character’s questioning—especially the 
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reader who, in the flow of reading Woolf’s novel, has already had the chance to align his 
or her perspective with the character.8 Molly Hite highlights the axiological openness—
or undecidability—of Mrs. Dalloway: this novel, she writes, “defamiliarizes, not only for 
aesthetic purposes . . . but to open up spaces for ethical questioning without necessarily 
guiding readers to definitive conclusions” (250). In short, by asking “Only human be-
ings?” Septimus invites readers to partake in his dissonant experience as a sign, a mark of 
their common belonging to humankind, while at the same time underdetermining the 
exact meaning of that belonging. 
Woolf’s phase is so effective and suggestive in its indeterminacy because it is used in a 
context where Septimus’s mind is anything but indeterminate for the reader: Woolf gives 
us direct—or almost direct—access to Septimus’s mental processes, his intention to 
throw himself from the window and his thinking that “life is good.”9 As I pointed out in 
the introduction, narrative tends to foreground characters’ beliefs, attitudes, and evalua-
tions, since the particularity of such mental states contributes to a text’s narrativity. It is 
in considering and to some extent sharing these “cognitions” that, for audiences of nar-
rative, the vicarious experience of dissonance can turn into a full-fledged experience of 
dissonance. In order to understand this point, we need to make a detour through a body 
of research—partly psychological, partly philosophical and literary-theoretical—on read-
ers’ empathy for characters. This will be the topic of the next section.  
 
 
3. Empathy for characters and attitude change: A thought experiment 
In relating to fictional characters readers learn about worldviews and beliefs systems that 
can be significantly different from those that guide their everyday life.10 Septimus suffers 
from rampant paranoia. He thinks he is “the Lord who had come to renew society . . . 
the scapegoat, the eternal sufferer” (27). He believes he can talk with Evans, his officer 
who died in the War. He is looking for an explanation for why “he could see through 
bodies, see into the future, when dogs will become men” (74). All these thoughts and 
images will strike readers who do not have any first-hand experience of mental illness as 
rather outlandish. Of course, we are often exposed to similar ideas in daily life. But fic-
tion provides a more or less safe haven for entertaining—and experimenting with—
beliefs and values that we tend to dismiss in real life. This is the idea behind literary theo-
rist Frank Hakemulder’s claim that fiction is a moral laboratory, where “plausible impli-
cations of human conduct can be studied in a relatively controlled and safe way” (150). I 
would hypothesize that our “defenses” against other worldviews are higher in real life, 
because of our realization that there is so much more at stake—including, of course, 
other people’s judgment of our words and actions. By contrast, in engaging with fictional 
characters we are more or less free to ‘try on’ other perspectives. In Keen’s words: “the 
perception of fictionality releases novel-readers from the normal state of alert suspicion 
of others’ motives that often acts as a barrier to empathy” (168).  
 
8 The metaphor of the alignment between the audience and a character comes from Murray Smith.  
9 That literature can give readers direct access to characters’ minds is a widely held view in narrative 
theory (see Cohn); for discussion in light of today’s cognitive sciences, see Herman (“Introduction”) 
and Caracciolo (“Beyond Other Minds”). 
10 I have speculated about this point in discussing readers’ engagement with two ‘strange’ narrators of 
contemporary fiction; see Caracciolo (“Two Child Narrators”). 
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This intuition about the sense of relative freedom that readers have while engaging 
with fictional worlds is supported by an empirical study conducted by Howard Sklar. 
This study sought to shed light on the temporal progression of readers’ sympathy for the 
protagonist of Toni Cade Bambara’s short story “The Hammer Man.” As is well-known, 
sympathy is distinct from empathy because it involves feeling for another (pity, sadness, 
compassion) rather than feeling what another feels by simulating his or her mental states. 
Before reading the short story, Sklar asked his participants to take a test known as “In-
terpersonal Reactivity Index” or “IRI” (see Davis), aimed at measuring dispositional em-
pathy and sympathy (that is, people’s predisposition to empathize or sympathize with 
others). The participants’ sympathy with the character was then assessed using their self-
reports. Comparing the results of the IRI test with the findings of the reading task, Sklar 
found that there is no correlation between dispositional sympathy and the situational 
sympathy that arose during the reading experience: 
 
the percentage of subjects who had high levels of sympathy on the IRI and also felt sym-
pathy for Manny [the protagonist of “The Hammer Man”] (72 percent) was roughly the 
same as the percentage of those who had low levels of sympathy on the IRI but still felt 
sympathy for Manny (70 percent). This suggests that the tendency to sympathize with 
others in daily life, as measured by the IRI, was not the determining factor in generating 
sympathy for the character as presented along the narrative. (594) 
 
Sklar’s experiment can therefore be taken as prima facie evidence for the view that 
awareness of fictionality leads readers to experiment with forms of intersubjectivity they 
would tend to disfavor in daily life. The same, of course, applies to empathy, which is 
sometimes seen as one of the components of sympathy (see Gruen and Mendelsohn). 
Over the past decade, a number of studies have argued that empathy plays a key role 
in audiences’ relations with literary characters (Hakemulder; Coplan; Keen): in reading 
literature, audiences tend to engage—and imaginatively ‘try on’—the perspective of the 
fictional character whose experience is foregrounded by the text. Philosopher Gregory 
Currie explains why such simulative activity might be beneficial: “To be critical of our 
own outlooks and to be willing to see advantages in the outlooks of others might be a 
useful thing. But to appreciate those advantages we might need to try on for size the per-
spectives from which they derive. Indeed, we might need to be willing to try on perspec-
tives we don’t initially find very attractive” (73). What is often overlooked, however, is 
that simulating characters’ perspectives might also have a downside: it might induce 
states of cognitive dissonance in readers. 
Philosophers such as Berys Gaut and Amy Coplan have conducted in-depth concep-
tual analyses of audiences’ empathetic engagement with characters. According to Coplan 
(144), in empathy or mental simulation the “self-other differentiation” is always pre-
served: we take on the perspective of another human being (in this case, a fictional char-
acter) without giving up our own everyday perspective. As Gaut (208) puts it, empathy is 
an “aspectual” phenomenon: it involves adopting only some aspects of a character’s per-
spective on the world, while keeping our own perspective in the background. But this 
backgrounded perspective is not, or not always, inert. Let’s run a simple thought experi-
ment. Suppose that a reader—let’s call him Peter—is deeply prejudiced against the men-
tally ill. Suppose that Peter’s prejudice plays an important role in his self-concept, per-
haps because of an unpleasant encounter he has had with a mentally ill person while he 
was a child: Peter sees all mentally ill patients as aggressive and potentially dangerous. 
The real world offers abundant evidence that Peter is wrong, but prejudices are hard to 
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eradicate. Reading Woolf’s novel and its presentation of the thought patterns of a men-
tally ill character, however, may give Peter food for thought. While Septimus’s mind is 
clearly out of kilter, he doesn’t seem to pose any threat to anyone but himself. This reali-
zation, together with the sense of relative freedom that goes with the fictionality of 
Woolf’s story, may induce Peter to tentatively adopt Septimus’s perspective: Peter may 
learn to see the world from the viewpoint of a young man who believes that trees are 
conscious and that love will save the world; he may even start to feel anger at the ob-
tuseness of the two doctors who try to help Septimus, and shock at Septimus’s throwing 
himself from the window. Yet this kind of perspective-taking is likely to clash with Pe-
ter’s habitual prejudice against the mentally ill—it is likely to give rise to a state of cogni-
tive dissonance.  
Note that this state qualifies as dissonant on Festinger’s original account, not on more 
recent social-psychological models. As we have seen in the previous section, such mod-
els focus on behavior and on the subject’s evaluation of the possible negative conse-
quences of an action. In adopting Septimus’s perspective, Peter is not performing an ac-
tion that may impact Peter’s well-being or public identity. Indeed, engaging with fictional 
worlds—and with characters within these fictional worlds—can give us a reassuring 
sense of segregation from the realm of real-world action and behavior. It is precisely this 
sense that seems to encourage Peter to give up his defenses and put on hold his preju-
dice against the mentally ill. Thus, the absence of real-world consequences appears to be 
the condition for the dissonant state Peter experiences when he realizes that the back-
grounded prejudice—which has such an important role in his self-concept—is incon-
sistent with his empathetic connection with Septimus: how is it possible to reconcile the-
se two attitudes? In other words, how is it possible to reduce the cognitive dissonance? 
The foregoing analysis has been highly speculative, and so will be my answers to these 
questions. I see readers’ strategies for reducing cognitive dissonance in their engagement 
with characters as falling on a continuum between two poles, which I will call “attitude 
change” and “imaginative resistance.” This is a continuum rather than a choice between 
two possibilities because both attitude change and imaginative resistance can be more or 
less intense, with weaker forms of attitude change approaching imaginative resistance 
(and vice versa). In the “grey area” between clear-cut instances of these strategies, the 
dissonance is felt only faintly and vicariously (i.e., on behalf of the characters) by readers, 
so that no distinct attempt is made to reduce it. In the remainder of this section I will 
deal with attitude change, turning to imaginative resistance in the next section. 
One way to cope with cognitive dissonance is, of course, to change the background 
attitude (in Peter’s case, a prejudice) that is causing trouble. There is some empirical evi-
dence that reading literature, and specifically empathizing with characters, can lead to at-
titude change in some situations. In an experiment, Frank Hakemulder asked two groups 
of participants to read two texts about the condition of women in Algeria. One group 
read a narrative text—a chapter from Malika Mokeddem’s novel The Forbidden Woman—
focusing on the difficulties and challenges experienced by a young Algerian woman. Nar-
rated by the woman herself, this text has the spatio-temporal particularity that is charac-
teristic of narrative. By contrast, the other text was an excerpt from Jan Goodwin’s essay 
Price of Honor, which examines the condition of Algerian women much more generally. 
Both texts can be read as denouncing the violation of women’s rights in fundamentalist 
Islamic societies. Yet Hakemulder’s study showed that reading the story had a stronger 
effect on the participants’ attitude towards women’s rights in Algeria than reading the 
essay. This is Hakemulder’s explanation for this finding: “a narrative presentation causes 
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stronger effects on our beliefs about the emotions and thoughts of others (social percep-
tion) than a non-narrative presentation with approximately the same contents . . . . Both 
texts probably primed the same memory schemata, namely, knowledge concerning 
women in Islamic countries. But, it seems to take a text with a character personifying the 
issue to change subjects’ beliefs” (107). 
There is no reason to think that, in this particular study, the participants’ belief 
change served to resolve a cognitively dissonant state. But there is no reason to think 
that this couldn’t happen either: to return to our thought experiment, it is at least a theo-
retical possibility that empathizing with Septimus may lead Peter to overcome his own 
prejudice against mentally ill people. Typically, the changes that result from the experi-
ence of dissonance are subtle shifts rather than dramatic personality changes. Take, for 
example, a famous study in which Cohen asked a group of Yale students—all of them 
strongly critical of the New Haven police department—to write an essay in favor of the 
police: the students’ attitude towards the police changed after the task, as a consequence 
of the cognitive dissonance between the position they had to take in the essay and their 
prior evaluations (see Cohen). However, Cooper points out that the students “did not 
come to believe that the police were the paragon of diplomacy and restraint— . . . they 
[just] were more understanding and positive to the police than they had been previously” 
(86).  
Likewise, Peter’s attitude towards the mentally ill may change only subtly—for exam-
ple by inviting him to tone down, rather than put aside, his prejudice. The experience Pe-
ter has gained by empathizing with Septimus may enrich his understanding of the phe-
nomenology of mental illness, which in turn may take the edge off his belief that all men-
tally ill people are violent. It is worth stressing here that attitude changes at this level may 
not necessarily lead to behavioral changes. Despite widespread claims about the ethical 
effects of reading literature (cf. Nussbaum 85–112), the jury is still out as to whether re-
lating to Septimus’s mental illness is likely to make Peter a better person. In her Empathy 
and the Novel, Suzanne Keen (85–93) has reviewed the empirical evidence for the 
prosocial effects of reading literature, concluding that it is mostly mixed or inadequate. 
Even if Peter’s attitude towards the mentally ill does change slightly to reduce the cogni-
tive dissonance, it may not result in more altruistic behavior because of what I have de-
scribed as the relative segregation of fictional storytelling practices. Still, we may specu-
late that cognitive dissonance is one of the driving forces behind readers’ attitude chang-
es in response to literary texts, and characters in particular. Such changes may affect both 
readers’ beliefs (as in Hakemulder’s experiment) and their self-concept and personality, 
as others empirical studies—some of them carried out by Hakemulder himself—suggest 
(Hakemulder 117–145; Oatley 160–162). More research is needed in this area, but it is 
conceivable that cognitive dissonance while reading literary fiction may have an impact 
on both readers’ subjective perception of themselves (self-concept) and on their person-
ality as measured through psychological tests. 
 
 
4. Imaginative resistance in Time’s Arrow 
I have hypothesized above that the perceived fictionality of storyworlds encourages 
readers to give up their defenses, making it easier for them to empathize (or sympathize) 
with fictional characters than with real people. In other words, the ontological barrier be-
tween the real and the fictional can act as a safety zone, encouraging readers to adopt ex-
periential perspectives that they would be less likely to relate to in real intersubjectivity. 
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Yet we shouldn’t exaggerate the gap between fictional worlds and the real world. Some 
fictional stories can ask the audience to engage with perspectives that are just too distant 
from—and incompatible with—readers’ own worldview for them to resolve the cogni-
tive dissonance by changing their attitude. This is the case of the second psychological 
phenomenon that I would like to examine here, which I call “imaginative resistance.”  
In the continuum of strategies through which readers cope with cognitive dissonance, 
imaginative resistance is exactly opposite to attitude change. This concept is at the center 
of a vigorous debate within analytic aesthetics—a debate that Kendall Walton has de-
scribed as “a tangled nest of importantly distinct, but easily confused, puzzles” (137). In 
this context, however, we can stick to one of the most influential formulations of the 
puzzle, Tamar Szabó Gendler’s: “Given that for the most part we have no trouble fic-
tionally entertaining all sorts of far-fetched and implausible scenarios, what explains the 
impediments we seem to encounter when we are asked to imagine moral judgments 
sharply divergent from those we ordinarily make?” (55). Let us reframe Gendler’s ques-
tion in the terms of our own discussion. It may be argued that imagining a physically or 
logically impossible state of affairs causes cognitive dissonance, since it leads to a clash 
between the impossible scenario that we are entertaining and real-world knowledge 
about its impossibility. Take, for example, Martin Amis’s 1991 novel Time’s Arrow. In this 
novel time runs backwards; later events seem to precede earlier events, consequences are 
taken as causes by the narrator, as shown by this reverse description of a car accident: 
 
There was my car, like a mad old hog caught in mid-spasm, its snout and tusks crushed 
and steaming. And I didn’t feel too good myself as the police officer helped wedge me in-
to its driving seat and tried to shut the warped front door. Thereafter I sat back and let 
Tod handle everything. He rammed his foot down on the brake and sent the car into a 
fizzing convulsion of rev and whinny. With a skilful lurch he gave the bent hydrant on the 
sidewalk a crunchy shouldercheck—and we were off, weaving at speed back up the street. 
Other cars screamed in to fill the sudden vacuum of our wake. (27–28) 
 
In order to make sense of this passage readers have to reconstruct a hypothetical se-
quence in which Tod loses control of the car, hits a hydrant, brakes sharply, and is sub-
sequently pulled from the wreckage by a police officer. To rearrange these events into 
their “correct” order the audience will have to rely on real-world knowledge and scripts 
(i.e., stereotypical action sequences) stored in their memory (see Gerrig 39–44).11 This 
situation is complicated by the fact that the narrator seems to interpret the events he 
witnesses as if they unfolded in a forward order: the policeman is seen wedging him “in-
to [the car’s] driving seat,” and Tom crashes the car into the hydrant with a “skilful 
lurch” (whereas, we imagine, there is nothing intentional—or skilful—about this act). 
Thus, the puzzlement that accompanies readers’ engagement with this novel results from 
the cognitive dissonance between two interpretations: in the first, events are reconstruct-
ed on the basis of real-world scripts (and therefore seen as happening backward), where-
as in the second readers try to follow the events according to the forward logic intro-
duced by the narrator.12 Incidentally, this shows that cognitive dissonance is a process 
 
11 Together with “frames,” “scripts” was one of the first cognitive-scientific concepts to make its way 
into narrative theory: see Gavins and Bernini and Caracciolo (43–47). 
12 Cf. Seymour Chatman’s statement: “Amis’s backward/antonymic reporting is selective. . . . That 
means we must recognize one more system at work in the novel: not only the backward/antonymizing 
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that can involve many aspects of the reading experience, not just the audience’s engage-
ment with characters (which is the main focus of this article). Note, however, that de-
spite the dissonance created by this double interpretation of narrative temporality readers 
do not have any difficulty in accepting the fact that events unfold in this way in the fic-
tional world. For all its inventiveness, Amis’s narrative technique asks readers to make 
the same imaginative leap that they make whenever they accept the possibility of a talk-
ing animal or dead narrator.13 
Readers’ imagination is not always this flexible, though. While we can easily imagine 
impossible or counterfactual states of affairs, we find it hard to take the stance of a char-
acter whose thoughts and behavior directly contradict our own ethical values and evalua-
tions. In imagining that something might be the case in a fictional world, we seem to be 
relatively freer than in accepting a perspective on the world that we consider immoral: 
we always tend to resist immorality. Derek Matravers puts this point as follows: “let p be 
the proposition that people can be instantaneously transported from a spaceship to the 
surface of the earth and q be the proposition that there is nothing wrong with female in-
fanticide. A reader can fictionally assent to the former, but cannot fictionally assent to 
the latter” (92). This phenomenon is (part of) what philosophers call “imaginative re-
sistance.” Let’s exemplify this idea, again by using Amis’s novel as a case study. 
Those who are not familiar with the novel will probably have had difficulties in un-
derstanding the exact relationship between the character named Tod and the narrator in 
the passage quoted above. Indeed, another paradoxical state of affairs that Time’s Arrow 
asks us to accept is that the narrator is an incorporeal entity—Chatman (38) calls him 
“Soul”—inhabiting Tod’s body. In his own words, the narrator has “no access to [Tod’s] 
thoughts—but [is] awash with his emotions” (15). This means that the narrator can feel 
Tod’s bodily, emotional states, but he is in the dark with respect to the character’s identi-
ty and past experiences (remember that the novel is told backwards, from Tod’s death to 
his birth). As we read into the novel, we begin suspecting that Tod is trying to cover up a 
murky past, towards which the story is slowly, but inexorably, progressing. And it is only 
in the second half of the novel that we discover Tod’s secret: he was one of the Nazi 
doctors who performed torturous medical experiments in the concentration camps dur-
ing World War Two. This truth emerges in chapter 5, which is—remarkably—the only 
chapter where the narrator seems to be one with Tod: he always refers to Tod in the first 
person rather than in the third person, as he did in the car accident sequence. For in-
stance, commenting on the operations of the gas chambers in Auschwitz, the narrator 
declares: “I or a doctor of equivalent rank was present at every stage in the sequence” 
(128). 
This revelation about the protagonist’s identity is likely to affect significantly the audi-
ence’s engagement with him. In earlier chapters, the narrator served in many ways as a 
guide for the audience: he shared both their sense of puzzlement at the backward tempo-
rality of the storyworld and their curiosity about Tod’s secret.14 This may have encour-
 
orientation but also the diegetically forward orientation we bring over from other narratives we’ve read. 
These systems are always in tension in Time’s Arrow” (46). 
13 Such physically or logically impossible stories are at the center of so-called “unnatural narratology.” 
See Alber et al.. 
14 See, for example, this passage from Time’s Arrow: “Tod’s fear, when I stop and analyse it, really is 
frightening. And inexplicable. It has to do with his own mutilation. Who might commit it? How can 
he avert it? / Watch. We’re getting younger. We are. We’re getting stronger. We’re even getting taller. I 
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aged readers to align their perspective with the narrator via narrative empathy. Yet in this 
chapter no such alignment is possible: the narrator’s ethical stance conflicts with the au-
dience, and the resulting cognitive dissonance can only be resolved by strongly rejecting 
his viewpoint. But there is another factor to consider—and here Amis’s narrative tech-
nique takes on its full significance. It is not only that the narrator approves of the extermi-
nation camps; it is that his (mis)construal of the backward nature of narrative time leads 
him to see what happens in the gas chambers as the creation—rather than the cessa-
tion—of life. Consider the following passage: 
 
What tells me that this [i.e., the mass extermination] is right? . . . Certainly not my aesthetic 
sense. I would never claim that Auschwitz-Birkenau-Monowitz was good to look at. Or to 
listen to, or to smell, or to taste, or to touch. . . . Not for its elegance did I come to love 
the evening sky, hellish red with the gathering souls. Creation is easy. Also ugly. Hier ist 
kein warum. Here there is no why. Here there is no when, no how, no where. Our preter-
natural purpose? To dream a race. To make a people from the weather. From thunder and 
from lightning. With gas, with electricity, with shit, with fire. (128) 
 
The tragic misunderstanding reflected by the narrator’s comments widens the divide be-
tween his ethical perspective and the reader’s: in addition to being morally wrong, the 
narrator is factually wrong in his interpretation of the Holocaust. The dissonance between 
the audience’s real-world knowledge and the narrator’s words can only result in the rejec-
tion of the narrator’s perspective. Thus, readers’ imaginative resistance becomes another 
strategy for dealing with the cognitive dissonance. Why couldn’t attitude change occur 
here? Simply put, because the historical knowledge and moral evaluations conflicting 
with the narrator’s interpretation are too important, and entrenched in readers’ 
worldview, to be overturned. Here we find an interesting exception to the idea of the rel-
ative segregation of fictional worlds: readers find it comparatively easy to accept a 
storyworld in which events unfold backward, but they find it hard to accept that what 
looks like the Holocaust might be construed as the creation—rather than the extermina-
tion—of a people. In the latter case, real-world values are brought to bear on the fiction-
al world and the fictional character in particular, negating the possibility of attitude 
change. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
The foregoing analysis shows how complex and multifaceted readers’ interaction with 
fictional worlds can be. On the one hand, I have hypothesized that the perceived sepa-
rateness of fiction can encourage the audience to experiment with experiential perspec-
tives that are considerably different from their own. Such temporary adoption of a char-
acter’s worldview and belief system through narrative empathy can even have a feedback 
effect on readers’ beliefs and self-concept. On the other hand, it seems that past a certain 
point—that is, when the character’s perspective becomes too alien and, especially, moral-
ly unacceptable—readers are not disposed to bracket their own values; the audience just 
breaks the empathetic bond with the character, resisting his or her perspective. While 
 
don’t quite recognize this world we’re in. Everything is familiar but not at all reassuring. Far from it. 
This is a world of mistakes, of diametrical mistakes” (15). Both the narrator’s questions about Tod’s 
past and his puzzlement at the strangeness of the storyworld are likely to be shared by readers.  
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these claims are, as I have already pointed out, merely speculative, they could easily lend 
themselves to empirical testing.  
More generally, the audience’s transactions with fictional worlds appear to be poised 
between ontological segregation from reality, and openness to the experiential values and 
evaluations that guide our interaction with the real world. Just like attitude change shows 
that the perspectives readers temporarily adopt while relating to characters can have an 
impact on their beliefs, values, and self-concept, imaginative resistance suggests that 
readers’ own values can, in some scenarios, discourage them from adopting fictional 
characters’ perspectives. In the first case the “direction of flow” seems to go from 
storyworlds to readers’ experiential background, since readers are influenced by their in-
teraction with fictional characters. In the second case, the “direction of flow” goes in the 
opposite direction: readers’ values prevent them from adopting a fictional perspective 
that they consider immoral or otherwise deviant (see Figure 1). This reveals the inherent-
ly evaluative or axiological nature of our encounters with fictional worlds and characters: 
despite the ontological divide between reality and fiction, readers’ engagement with liter-
ary stories brings into play—and allows them to negotiate—real-world values (see Gib-
son 107–110).  
It is because of this interplay of segregation and openness that cognitive dissonance 
may arise, guiding readers’ responses to fiction and shaping the ways in which 
storyworlds can penetrate into readers’ experiential background. In this article I have ex-
amined attitude change and imaginative resistance as alternative strategies for dealing 
with cognitive dissonance, but it should be clear that these strategies are at the opposite 
ends of a continuum (see again Figure 1): both of them can have different degrees of in-
tensity, so that between clear-cut cases of either strategy there is a vast grey area where 
attitude changes are difficult to detect, and imaginative resistance weak and intermittent. 
Cognitive dissonance is perhaps less evident here, but it is—in my view—always in the 
background of readers’ engagement with characters. This kind of dissonance is mostly 
vicarious rather than felt by readers in a first-person way: it is experienced by readers not 
in response to but on behalf of the characters. It could be speculated that literary narra-
tives tend to keep dissonance in this grey area: they generate a friction between readers’ 
and characters’ worldview, but such friction is not so strong as to result in attitude 
change or in a rejection of the characters’ attitudes. Most of our transactions with fic-
tional characters seem to occur in this area, where the dissonance is created without be-
ing resolved. We’ve seen three examples of these patterns of cognitive dissonance: atti-
tude change, in the thought experiment where relating to Woolf’s Septimus led Peter to 
revise his prejudice against the mentally ill; vicarious dissonance, when readers experi-
enced Septimus’s dissonance as he is torn between wanting to commit suicide and liking 
life; and imaginative resistance, in our rejection of the point of view of the narra-
tor/character of Time’s Arrow. 
As I argued at the beginning of this article, dissonance is a key ingredient of storytell-
ing: narratives, and especially highly “tellable” narratives, thrive on conflicts among and 
within characters. To borrow Edmund Husserl’s term (later applied to literature by Paul 
Ricoeur), literary storytelling can be seen as a long series of “imaginative variations” on 
cognitive dissonance and the many narrative trajectories it can give rise to. Further, alt-
hough it would be impossible to explore this idea in full here, such variations can help 
readers come to terms with the dissonance—between seeing and imagining, having and 
desiring, being and not being—that accompanies their daily lives.  
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FIGURE 1 Patterns of cognitive dissonance in readers’ engagement with characters 
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